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ABSTRACT 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
High Reliability Organizations (HROs) are organizations with processes that have extremely low 
failure rates, because the costs of failures are extremely high. According to Weick, et al. (2008) 
key aspects of HROs are: preoccupation with failure, reluctance to simplify, sensitivity to 
operations, among others. While we understand What the aspects of HROs are, we lack the 
understanding of How to implement HROs and Why they work. Using a Soft Research Methods 
approach with Mindfulness techniques, this study demonstrates implementation of HRO in 
Healthcare. In doing so, this research finds that Mindfulness techniques used with Soft Systems 
Methods provide an effective framework to create HROs. In doing so, this study also discovers a 
sixth aspect of HRO’s.  
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Keywords: High Reliability Organizations, Mindfulness, Soft Systems Methods, Healthcare 
Operations Management 
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Creating High Reliability Organizations Using Mindfulness 
 
1. Introduction 
 
High Reliability Organizations (HROs) refer to organizations that typically operate in 
hazardous environments where the consequences of process failures are extremely high (Baker, 
et al., 2006).  They are very costly to create and manage, and usually involve large technical 
systems like utilities, military institutions, healthcare, etc.  Overtime however, HRO investment 
pays-off by preventing the high costs of process failure (Hales et al., 2012) which according to 
Deming (1986) are the highest costs of all.  One recent example is the failed launch of the 
Affordable Healthcare Act website (HealthCare.Gov) in November 2013. Blamed on an 
incompetent contractor (CGI Group), and over-site failures of the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS), this single failure threatened to destroy a key accomplishment of U.S. 
President Barrack Obama. Several researchers (e.g., Wieck, et al., 2008) have identified key 
aspects of HROs: (1) a preoccupation with failure, (2) a reluctance to simplify interpretations, (3) 
sensitivity to operations, (4) under-specification of structures, and (5) a commitment to 
resilience.  Despite their value, there is a paucity of management research on HROs, specifically 
on how they are created and why they work.  In fact, Weick et al. (2008, p. 32) states that 
important features of HRO implementations still “remain unarticulated”.   While we understand 
what the aspects of HROs are, we lack the understanding of how to systematically create HROs 
and why they work to improve reliability.   
The purpose of this research is to show how to systematically implement HROs using a 
Soft Research Methods approach moderated with Mindfulness techniques.  Soft Research 
Methods are qualitative techniques used when formal experimentation and quantification of the 
variables are difficult or impossible (Liu et al., 2012).  The activities of Mindfulness fit into the 
Soft Research Methods framework because they are qualitative techniques as described by 
Chakravorty and Hales, (2013). This study describes how an HRO implementation improved the 
reliability of patient care in a critical care unit (CCU).  In doing so, this research contributes in 
two ways.  First, for practitioners this research suggests how to create HRO organizations 
through systematic implementation of the HRO aspects using Mindfulness techniques.  Second, 
it answers the question of why the aspects work to improve reliability. This is important because 
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developing and operating an HRO is challenging due to the extraordinary reliability demanded 
by its clients and the high costs of failure (LaPorte and Consolini, 1999; Hales et al., 2012).  In 
doing so, a sixth HRO aspect was discovered; the aspect of “fast, accurate, and robust 
information systems”. Second, for academicians, this study suggests future research in the 
impacts of failures can benefit the management literature, as they have done in engineering (e.g., 
Beer, et al., 2012).  
 
2. Literature Review 
 
2.1 Highly Reliability Organizations (HROs)  
 
HROs focus on delivering high reliability outcomes to clients through very low failure 
rates (Issel, Michele, and Narasimha, 2007; Kaplan, 2002).  Since reliability is a key dimension 
of quality (Garvin, 1987) greater reliability can lead to greater organizational competitiveness. 
Since most HRO studies are conducted in large technical systems, i.e. the Military, public 
utilities, and healthcare, its’ assumed that these contexts benefit the most from HRO 
implementations.  A few organizations that successfully compete on reliability demonstrate this 
(i.e. Schulamn, 1996). While several researchers worked on HROs over the years (e.g., Seaman 
and Williams, 2012; Chassin and Loeb, 2011), Weick and Sutcliffe’s work is considered seminal 
(Weick et al., 2008; Weick and Sutcliff, 2007; Weick and Sutcliff, 2006; and Weick et al., 1999). 
Their collective work identifies five aspects that are present in all HRO implementations. 
1. (5A1) A preoccupation with failure suggests that is to prevent failures by preoccupying itself with discovering 
them and their causes. Preoccupation with failure focuses on points of failure by increasing alertness, fighting 
inertia, looking for new alternatives, identifying errors, and developing processes to prevent mistakes. 
 
2. (5A2) A reluctance to simplify interpretations promotes a thoughtful, data-driven process that considers the 
uniqueness of a problem before applying a solution. It discourages the form-fitting application or popular ‘best 
practice’ solutions to problems without thorough consideration of the problem’s unique context. 
 
3. (5A3) A sensitivity to operations recognizes that a solution to one problem may create another and therefore 
process-wide measurement is essential. Sensitivity to operations is similar to the concept of a “bubble” in Navy 
terminology that refers to the awareness of a ship’s overall condition in the moment.  This is accomplished 
through sharing real time data, shifting problems to experts, and engaging in face to face communication. 
 
4. (5A4) An under-specification of structures refers to using the highest level of recognized expertise in improving 
reliability, not necessarily the higher-ranking “boss”. Under-specification of structures discourages excessive 
formal ranks because the ranking individual may not be in the proximity when the event occurs, may be too 
detached from the event to quickly respond, or may not possess the requisite knowledge, instead it relies on the 
lowest-level possible.  
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5. (5A5) A commitment to resilience encourages the use of individual initiative to maintain process improvements 
long-term. It encourages activities to prevent failures and relies on the expertise of front-line workers to reduce 
response time and counter immediate, evolving threats or “absorb” as much of the threat as possible. 
 
Weick and Sutcliffe identified aspects of HROs but not a method for implementing them 
or why they improve reliability.  In addition, they don’t identify how they measured reliability or 
how reliability increased.  The purpose of this study is to examine a measured increase in 
reliability through a successful HRO implementation using Soft Research Methods moderated by 
Mindfulness techniques. In doing so, a sixth aspect of HROs was discovered.  
 
2.2 Soft Research Methods   
 
Soft Research Methods such as Case Studies, Action Research, Soft Systems 
Methodology (SSM) are formal methods appropriate when examining How and Why questions 
because the variables are ill-defined, the causal links in real-life interventions are poorly 
understood or too complex for surveys or experimental designs (Yin, 2014).  This makes soft 
methods appropriate for exploratory research addressing problems that are difficult to quantify, 
and involve multiple objectives inappropriate for traditional analytical techniques (e.g., 
Checkland, 2011; Checkland, 2000). Soft methods are appropriate for this study since the 
knowledge of How and Why real-world HRO implementations work is lacking in the literature 
(Ackermann, 2012).  Soft methods, have been applied to initiate problem-solving and research in 
many studies (Ormerod, 1998; Paucar-Caceres, 2010; Mingers, 2011).  Over the years authors 
have discussed varying types and stages of soft methods (e.g., Rodriguez-Ulloa and Paucar-
Caceres, 2005; Creswell, 2002). Checkland’s work on soft methods, which he refers to SSM, 
utilizes seven steps and they are:  
 
1. (SSM1) Confronting/Identifying the problem situation (or Event)  
2. (SSM2) Identifying the people, culture, or norms involved (i.e. the stakeholder’s and context) 
3. (SSM3) Developing root definitions that describe the ideal system  
4. (SSM4) Building a Conceptual Model or a diagram of the system 
5. (SSM5) Comparing models to the real world  which questions  each relationship in the model 
6. (SSM6) Identifying changes  that are needed to the current system related to the problem 
7.    (SSM7) Taking action or using an action plan to implement the changes previously identified 
    
While this study uses the seven steps of SSM described above, it does not use 
Checkland’s 5 E’s (Checkland, 2011) which suggests SSM outcomes should include measures of 
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efficacy, efficiency, elegance, effectiveness, and ethicality. But HROs are primarily concerned 
with reliability so therefore ‘reliability” is the key measure. Because of this, a full use of SSM is 
not claimed. 
 
2.3 Mindfulness 
 
Mindfulness practices are qualitative techniques that encourage high levels of alertness to 
a task (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2006). It promotes understanding among the players in how their 
actions contribute to improving process performance. Mindfulness techniques have improved 
reliability in healthcare (Matook and Kautz, 2008; Hales et al., 2012; Weick and Sutcliffe, 2006). 
Mindfulness is often operationalized through three activities; a) the use of frequent meditation, b) 
a willingness on the part of providers to objectively solve problems using context-specific 
solutions, and c) time to meaningfully communicate with others on the problem at-hand. This is 
important because it challenges the “best practice” approach suggesting that solutions in one 
context will automatically work in a different context; which practitioners know is not always 
true (Brown, and Duguid, 1999; Szulanski, 1996).   
 
2.4 Integration of HRO-SSM with Mindfulness 
 
In this case, Mindfulness improved the implementation of SSM stages 1, 2, and 6 because 
it encourages a high level of alertness to a task, and an understanding how the players activities 
contribute to improve reliability for customers (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2006).  The first step in 
Mindfulness, frequent meditation, clears the mind of random thoughts so that full attention can 
be given to identify an immediate threat to a patient, a problem, or its’ causes (SSM Step 1). The 
second step encourages objective understanding of the context and stakeholders affected by an 
action (SSM – Step 2), and develops solutions that are more effective because they are context 
specific (SSM – Step 6). The objectivity encourages data-driven analysis of a situation so that the 
best solution is applied.  In this case, healthcare workers are encouraged to meditate 5-10 
minutes every few hours, and then to clear their mind for 1-2 minutes before treating each 
patient. To prevent superficially reacting to an issue, providers are taught to (third step in 
Mindfulness) communicate with other providers frequently on patient condition and briefly 
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evaluate how a treatment affects each patient.  Figure 1, the implementation model, shows the 
relationship among the seven SSM steps, HRO Five Aspects, three practices of Mindfulness, and 
their effects on reliability.  It shows that Mindfulness supports the SSM Steps and 
implementation of the HRO Aspects (SSM steps *1, *2, and *6 were found later to be most 
affected by Mindfulness). The SSM steps supported the HRO Aspects, leading to improvement 
in patient care reliability.    
_____________ 
Insert Figure 1 
_____________ 
 
3. The Case Study 
 
Regional Health Care (RHC) decided to implement HRO to address a decline in CCU 
performance, a unit treating 4,000 patients/annually.  Healthcare literature promotes HRO 
because failures result in higher societal costs like higher healthcare costs and patient deaths 
(Hines, et al., 2008).  Beginning in June of 2010, CCU receives patients from other units when 
intense and specialized treatment is required, usually from Emergency Centers, Trauma/Burn 
Units, and Operating Recovery. CCU’s a 20-room facility with rooms at the perimeter and an 
open-facing central nurse’s station for monitoring patient care.  Administration is performed in 
the nurse’s station on patient’s medical charts, medication and treatment, and incident reports.  
The nurse-supervisor, researchers, stand-by equipment, and volunteers called “candy-stripers” 
are located there.  Nurses rotate between the 20 patient rooms, returning to the station to 
complete paperwork. 
 
3.1 Data Collection 
 
Baseline data was collected January-June, 2010; with implementation data July-
December, 2010; and follow-up through the summer of 2012.  Data collection included direct 
participation and observation, review of log books, and interviews with patients, nurses, 
supervisors, and RHC managers as suggested by Yin (2014).  The interviews began with semi-
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structured questions developed in advance and then revised based on the responses and feedback 
from participants, as proposed by Kvale and Brinkmann (2009).   
The researchers participated in training and mentoring nurses, CCU staff, and nurse-
supervisors.  Training was conducted over a two-week period and included Mindfulness 
techniques and demonstrations in meditation by a yoga instructor. Nurses practiced pausing 1 – 2 
min. between patients and communicating important information.  For novices, she conducted a 
30-min. class in the Mind-full room.  Researchers provided daily feedback to nurses on the 
results of their previous days’ performance, observed new issues in the unit supervisors and 
volunteers, reviewed incident logs, observed nurse-patient interactions, and documented unit 
HRO efforts. Nurses contemplate entries for incident logs - including observations of possible 
root causes of problems including a) RHC policies that they feel interfere with patient care, b) 
activities of supervisors/others in CCU that harm reliability, c) suggestions for improving 
reliability, and d) ideas or observations about how the five-aspects were implemented. Nurses 
discussed their problems with HRO, and their perception of the effect on patients. Next, a plan 
was developed to implement the suggested solutions and responsibility was assigned for 
implementation of each activity. This was repeated weekly beginning with a gap analysis of the 
difference between existing system and ideal targets. This approach is referred to as “Learning 
by Doing” (Hayes et al., 2004) where training is followed by practice on real problems.  Hayes et 
al., demonstrates that improvement techniques will fail unless managers develop this capability 
in their organizations. Learning by doing is another soft methods concept that relies on front-line 
experience to solve problems. The data collection cycle is shown in Figure 2.  
_____________ 
Insert Figure 2 
_____________ 
 
3.2 Data Analysis 
 
The analysis was performed iteratively with a panel of healthcare experts comprised of 
the two researchers (R1 & R2), a nurse consultant, CCU supervisors (Superv 1 & Superv 2), the 
RHC Chief Financial Officer (RHC Fin Chief) and three external members from other units.  
Responses were shared to ensure that the panel accurately captured their meaning. Then, the 
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expert panel was shown the implementation model, Figure 1, and the definitions shown in the 
Literature Review (SSM 1 -7; Mind 1-3; and 5A 1-5), and asked to evaluate the relationships 
between the three factors using interview responses and their own observations. To analyze the 
activities a Q-sort was used to classify the opinions of the panel (Chakravorty and Hales, 2008).  
Q-sort places panel observations on 3x5 cards - who then classify them by similarities into fewer 
groups, in an iterative, multi-round process, until consensus is reached. This classification and 
relationship approach is often referred to as Grounded Theory (Creswell, 2002), where the 
definitions and each element are identified by classification and then sequenced by relationship. 
Results are shown in Table 1. Because the full Q-sort examined 105 possible relationships (3-
Mind x 5-Aspects x 7-SSM) across 6 respondents (630 Q-cards), only those with strong support 
are shown (Support Level = 3 – 6). Support Level in the “last” column reports the respondents 
supporting the proposed relationships from the “first” column. The details of how each factor 
moderated the others are in the case descriptions.  
_____________ 
Insert Table 1 
_____________ 
3.3. Cost of Process Failures in RHC – Stated in U.S. Dollars $ 
 
In CCU, 10% of healthcare cost is for malpractice insurance, plus additional liability 
costs for high-risk treatment with anesthesiologists, neurosurgeons or obstetricians. Therefore, 
90% of the external failure costs are built-in through insurance premiums, averaging 
$500/day/patient. RHCs share of liability claims is 10%, with the average malpractice award of 
US $1.81 Million. Roughly 77% of claims are in this range (Karpoff and Lott, 1999); RHC’s 
average for each paid claim is $90,500. Malpractice claims occur in 3.7% of admissions, with 
27.6% resulting in payouts (Brennan, et al., 2004). In the U.S., 5/4,000 claims receive awards. 
Averaging $1.81 Million/award, CCU payouts are $9 Million/year plus $410,000/claim co-pays. 
This equals $2.5 Million/year for failure costs, but more importantly it equates to $11.5 Million 
in system losses. Implementing HRO could save RHC $2.5 Million/year, with system-wide 
savings of $11.5 Million.   
 
4.0 Description of HRO Implementation 
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RHC prepared a detailed implementation plan using the SSM seven steps.  Note that 
multiple examples for each HRO aspect were found as the implementation progressed, which are 
too numerous for a single article; therefore, a few examples recommended by the panel are 
reported.  In the following discussion each HRO aspect was executed through SSM, including 
Mindfulness. 
 
4.1. Soft Methods – Step 1 – Confronting/Identifying the Problem Situation 
 
In HRO, identifying the potential failure is accomplished through aspect, A 
Preoccupation with Failure.  This means that CCU is focused on identifying activities that lead 
to process failures that affect reliability. The reliability of CCU prior to the HRO effort is 
measured as the ‘percentage of patients discharged alive’.   Viewing unit failure as the death of a 
patient means that interim mistakes on patient care are not perceived as critical as long as they 
are recoverable.   The participants realized that CCU’s performance is directly related to many 
possible failures along two dimensions – a) its ability to discharge patients alive (a dichotomous 
variable – true/false), and antecedents as b) stable vital signs (physiological indicators such as 
blood pressure and temperature; and behavioral indicators such as alertness and agitation). As 
part of the effort, these become CCU’s measures of reliability.  
A preoccupation with failure that harms reliability becomes the focus of this step. CCU 
personnel were asked to meditate for 10 minutes daily and focus on potential failure points.  
Nurses and supervisors identified seven major factors that harm reliability; a) unqualified 
caregivers, b) unqualified volunteers, c) faulty monitoring equipment, d) poor nurse-physician 
understanding on treatment, e) slow nurse response time, f) inappropriate patient admissions, and 
g) patient intangibles.  CCU releases patients either through a death certificate or discharge to 
other RHC units, never directly.  A preoccupation with failure treats any activity that threatens 
reliability as a potential failure.   
Actors identified several antecedents to the seven key failures reported in the unit 
supervisor inspection. They were asked not to presuppose any cause-effect relationship nor 
assign blame to individuals, but instead try to maintain objectivity and consider behavior, not 
perceived intentions or motivations of those involved. Unit inspections were conducted 
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informally at the beginning of each rotation to ensure the physical unit met minimum standards.  
For example, items on the inspections that affect “nurse-physician understanding on treatment” 
include the accuracy and timeliness of treatment and medication.  Another item is “cleanliness of 
the unit”, where failures can lead to source infections for the patients.  The item “completeness 
of unit paperwork” is important because CCU nurses receive unit-specific training on paperwork 
needed to order maintenance and replenish supplies.  Each day failed items on the inspection 
report are discussed at staff meetings and corrective action is taken.  The report encourages a 
“preoccupation with failure” culture by listing the problems encountered each shift that can harm 
reliability.  Potential failure points are in the report along with the acceptable tolerances. 
Differences are flagged for corrective action.   
 
4.2. Soft Methods - Step 2 - Identify the People, Culture, and Norms involved 
 
After the opportunity is identified, Step 2 encourages understanding of the people 
involved in patient reliability – i.e. Actors, Customers, Process Owners, and the culture and 
norms they practice.  This links the system inputs to outputs so that relevant variables and 
activities can be identified, and their relationships to reliability. In this case, the rates of “live 
discharges” and “stable vital signs”.  One application of the HRO aspect A Reluctance to 
Simplify literally means to stop oversimplifying problems and understand their unique 
relationship to reliability.  It encourages questioning assumptions related to solutions, or 
especially so-called “best practices” that have reportedly improved reliability in other CCUs.  It 
encourages the understanding of how process change affects unit reliability.  
As the name implies, “over simplification” of the causes and effects of any failure point 
leads to ineffective solutions, and thus harms reliability. A Reluctance to Simplify implies 
discouraging “best practices” promoted in the Operations literature to ensure that the process 
stakeholders are not stereo-typed into some preconceived context that may or may not be 
accurate or improve reliability.  In CCU there are many norms that may affect reliability.  First, 
there is a strong sense of diversity where appreciation of culture has harmed unit response time.  
For example, in Moslem cultures males are not allowed to perform physical examinations on 
women, so these patients must wait until a suitable physician is found. In a different context, 
Spanish speaking-only patients are increasingly common but caregivers that speak fluent Spanish 
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are rare. These cultural considerations are addressed in - Step 2. Mindfulness in this stage 
encourages nurses and physicians to take 1 – 2 minute breaks and clear all matters not related to 
the patient. It creates focus on the immediate threat and understanding of the unique 
characteristics of the problem to prevent hasty application of a treatment.   
 
4.3. Soft Methods – Step 3 – Developing Root Definitions that Describe the Ideal System  
 
Once the context is fully understood, Step 3 builds on Step 2 by clearly defining the 
CATWOE – Customer, Actors, Transformation, Worldview, Owner, and Environment for those 
who make the unit safer, and articulate CCU’s ideal state.  The ideal state doesn’t need to be 
immediately practical, but must accurately identify and clearly articulate the future. In HRO, this 
can encourage A Reluctance to Simplify.  Customers are the beneficiaries of CCU’s reliability 
and include societal benefits such as preserving life.  Actors are all those participating in 
transforming inputs into outputs that increase reliability.  The Transformation process defines 
what and how inputs are transformed into the outputs.  The Worldview ensures that reliability 
contributes to society by preserving life - the basis for modern civilization. The Owner has the 
legal authority and responsibility for the resources and outcomes.  The Environment considers 
the limitations on any solution based on context.  With clear consideration for these variables in 
HROs, A Reluctance to Simplify is encouraged by identifying the current and ideal condition of 
CATWOE.  The use of Current State and Future State diagrams from the Lean literature meet 
these criteria. 
Developing root definitions in HRO, i.e. the ideal CCU system, can be done with six 
brief statements.  First, the Customers in CCU are the patients and society in general through 
lives saved.  Currently millions of dollars in malpractice claims are paid on healthcare failures, 
so improving unit reliability reduces societal costs. To RHC and insurance companies, the ideal 
condition is to prevent malpractice claims.  Second, the Actors are the participants in CCU, such 
as nurses, doctors, volunteers, etc. who contribute directly to improve reliability. The ideal 
condition is for Actors to improve reliability by addressing key drivers such as faster response 
and better understanding. Third, the Transformation Process is reflected in CCUs performance 
measures. The primary inputs are critically-ill patients with unstable vital signs, and caregivers 
such as nurses, physicians, medicine, and equipment. The outputs are “transformed” patients 
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who leave the unit alive and stable. Successful transformations result in no paid malpractice 
claims.  Fourth, in the Worldview, reliability results in the preservation of life.  Reduced medical 
costs free resources to be used in other departments and provide greater benefits for the Owners.  
A root definition in SSM refers to a type of mission statement encompassing individual root 
definitions. The ideal condition for CCU is, “Actors improve reliability to 100% so that all 
patient lives are preserved, resulting in societal savings and no malpractice payouts.”  
Fifth, the Owner identifies who controls and accepts liability for CCU. The RHC 
President and insurance companies are ultimately responsible for poor reliability.  Sixth, the 
Environmental constraints in CCU are conditions that limit reliability, but for which the Owners 
have no immediate control.  This includes treatment recommended by a physician but not 
allowed by RHC or insurance.  Another Environmental constraint is that CCU can’t choose 
patients, and occasionally patients are admitted who are inappropriate for the type of care the 
unit provides; those too sick and should be admitted to ICU; or those too healthy and appropriate 
for general care. Constraints are identified by events that are difficult, or sometimes impossible 
to control by the process Owners and Actors. 
 
4.4. Soft Methods Steps 4 & 5: 4) Building a conceptual model and 5) Comparing models to the 
real-world situation.  
 
This step recognizes that conceptual models are needed to understand complex processes.  
After models are diagramed they can be shared and tested to evaluate their representativeness of 
real-world processes.  In HRO, model development can be used as one tool to create A Sensitivity 
to Operations, which can include the customer and externally the Worldview, organization, or 
society.  To evaluate effects on other units, SSM encourages building conceptual models of CCU 
activities and causal links to create common understanding among the Actors in how each 
activity affects reliability.  Figure 3 is the conceptual model of the variables that affect CCU 
reliability.  It demonstrates the transformational process from inputs to outcomes and facilitates 
sensitivity analysis, where the impact of a change in one operation can be evaluated for its effect 
on others.  
_____________ 
Insert Figure 3 
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_____________ 
 
For example, CCU only accepts patients from other units such as ICU; and are usually 
released back to these units. CCUs performance directly affects other units, often involving 
numerous Actor interactions. Additionally, the unit receiving the patient can also affect 
reliability.  During the implementation of sensitivity to operations, physicians and nurses from 
other units are encouraged to share their experience with CCU, face-to-face, so that meaning is 
clear.  
 
4.5. Soft Methods – Step 6 – Identifying Changes Needed to the Current System 
 
Identifying Changes in Soft Methods refers to identifying problems and solutions to 
improve reliability. The problems and solutions must be measurable, or else improvement can’t 
be achieved (Deming, 1986). In HRO, any change should improve reliability. Mindfulness 
methods were especially helpful in this stage because providers were asked to meditate on a 
specific issue and conceptualize solutions to a unique problem. Patient issues can be complex 
due to high variance in illness or injury, degree of injury, age and gender of patient, patient 
attitude, etc. where “best practices” may not apply. To facilitate this, an unused break-room, 
called the Mind-full room, was set aside with comfortable furniture, mats, and quiet areas. At the 
end of each break, the providers documented their ideas to discuss later on. The Identifying 
Changes step can be used to encourage the timely recognition and reactions that harm reliability. 
This is expressly recognized in HRO aspect An Under-specification of Structures which 
encourages the identification and implementation of solutions to address or prevent threats at 
front-line levels; based on the idea that front-line workers and supervisors recognize threats and 
try potential solutions much faster than hierarchical ranks (Brown and Duguid, 1999).  
Mindfulness supports Soft Method’s identifying “feasible and desirable changes” to counter 
immediate threats at the lowest level of the organization.  Under-specification of structures is a 
control model that suggests control in HRO organizations should be relatively flat and decisions 
should be left up to expertise.  
In RHC the unit structure is relatively flat. CCU’s nurse supervisors control manpower 
and assignments, while physicians control treatment.  Nurses are the next level and are 
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responsible for implementing care. When a CCU nurse executes a physician’s treatment 
protocol, this is identified in Soft Methods taking action. In under-specification of structures at 
the unit level, the majority of requests to change/adjust treatment are generated by a nurse at the 
low end of the organizational structure, not the physician. Before recommending changes 
however, nurses were encouraged to meditate on the problem and discuss their ideas with peers 
before discussing with a physician. The inhibiting factor in implementing under-specification of 
structures in RHC has been the insurance, managed-care structures, which have become over-
specified structurally where control is held in hierarchical ranks outside the unit.   
 
 4.6. Soft Methods – Step 7 – Taking Action or Developing an Action Plan to Implement Changes  
 
In CCU, this step is straight forward and encourages the implementation of a solution or 
at least an action plan where the implementation may be complex. This step can also be used to 
assist HRO because it encourages the use of expertise to develop and implement solutions.  This 
means that the greatest expertise at the lowest practical level of the organization should be those 
who implement solutions because the HRO literature reports they can be more effective.   
In HRO, this is referred to as A Commitment to Resilience where organizations that have 
created high reliability process must put forth effort to maintain the reliability.  Action plans 
encourage resilience because they can contain a protocol that specifies the activities to be 
executed when a failure occurs.  In doing so, it quickly recovers from a failure. Resilience is part 
of the action plan in CCU. For example, a key element for the unit is life-support equipment, 
which can alarm and quickly initiate life-saving procedures when patients are threatened. CCU 
had to share equipment with ICU - and since ICU was considered higher priority the equipment 
was minimally available. An action plan was developed called “critical locater”, which is 
initiated by any nurse or physician.  It begins with a wireless tracking device that can locate any 
equipment, and if available rushed to CCU.  In fact, underlying this entire HRO implementation 
is the speed, accuracy, and resilience of communication. We argue that this is the sixth aspect of 
HROs, namely that all HROs must have a fast, accurate, and robust information system to enable 
implementation of the other five aspects.  
 
5. Results 
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As mentioned earlier, the RHC uses national performance measures (NQMC, 2009) 
instead of the 5Es. The RHC measured Efficiency, Process, and Outcomes. These are shown in 
Table 2, Column 1. Column 2 reports the metrics that comprise each measure. Column 3 shows 
the benchmark data, January, 2010 – June, 2010. Column 4 provides the data for January, 2010 - 
December, 2010, including six months of implementation.  Column 5 displays the follow-up data 
for June, 2011 - June 2012, to report the impact of HRO implementation.  Data not provided are 
shown as Not Reported (NR).  Efficiency measures the time and cost of patient care. While not 
directly related to reliability, the costs are essential measures to justify the benefits of HRO. As 
seen in Table 2 – the costs of patient care dropped by $100/patient during the period following 
the implementation, reversing a trend of increasing costs. This improvement is partially driven 
by the fewer hours needed to achieve a successful discharge (70 hours/patient versus 75 hours).  
_____________ 
Insert Table 2 
_____________ 
 
The most direct Process measure for reliability is c) percentage of patients discharged 
alive with stable vital signs. During the benchmark period, this reliability measure was 93.8%. 
After implementation it increased to 99.5%, improving by 24 patients. Given an increase in 
admissions of 22 patients, this is a statistically significant improvement of 5.3% in reliability.  
Additional Outcome measures b) mortality rate of AMI, and f) live discharge are also reliability 
measures. This shows that fewer patients died from AMI, 1.5% before HRO, down to .9% after 
implementation, a 60% improvement in reliability. The percentage of patients discharged alive 
improved by 100%, going from 22 deaths per 1,997 admissions, to 22 deaths per 4,020 
admissions. 
While it is difficult to directly measure how Mindfulness positively impacted 
performance, all of the nurses and many of the physicians used the 30-minute meditation and the 
1-2 mini-break techniques before treating a patient. They all reported benefits of using 
Mindfulness in improving focus and attentiveness, supporting the Mindfulness concept that 
paying more attention to patients and their unique characteristics leads to improved care.  The 
difficulty of using Mindfulness is during peak demand, when care is often relegated to “putting 
out fires”, where pausing for meditation is not practical.    
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These results objectively demonstrate that the five aspects of HRO can improve process 
reliability as long as key information is communicated effectively and efficiently. We argue that 
this is the sixth aspect of HROs. The improvement between the benchmark period and the post-
implementation period in 2012 are not only statistically significant, but practically important 
since they represent human lives.  
 
6. Implications of HRO Implementation 
 
We argue the implementation of HRO is effective because it contains the framework of 
Soft Methods developed from scientific principles.  Although semantically different, the aspects 
of HRO are highly similar to those of SSM.  Improved reliability of CCU suggests that Soft 
Methods is an effective approach to guide HRO.  This means that a preoccupation with failure is 
an effective method to prevent process failures.  Mindfulness creates better understanding and 
attention to the stakeholders involved in the process (actors, customers, etc.).  A reluctance to 
simplify a problem or solution, or misidentifying the stakeholders, can lead to poor 
understanding and ineffective solutions, especially where “best practices” dominate. Next, the 
processes that control the outcomes must be visual so that everyone understands their role in 
preventing failures. This is especially important to creating Sensitivity to Operations to prevent 
one improvement from harming another. Care-giver sensitivity to patients was improved using 
meditation prior to treatment. Once the operations, processes, and their relationships have been 
identified, individuals with the greatest expertise can manage these processes. Because “time is 
of the essence”, those with expertise closest to the failure have the greatest chance of responding 
quickly with the correct action.  Only after a solution has been shown to work can the unit move 
to ensure it is enforced. The enforcement of solutions requires discipline that creates resilience.   
In HRO’s preoccupation with failure, RHC relentlessly pursued activities that harmed 
reliability.  These efforts often began with providers identifying failure points that occur in the 
system and their potential impacts.  Failure studies can provide incredible insights in improving 
performance (e.g., Capozzi, et al., 2013), and have been extensively conducted in engineering 
(e.g., Beer, et al., 2012).  There is a need for more failure studies in organizations, specifically on 
the mechanisms that identify failure points, how they are dealt with, and why, despite these 
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efforts, organizations still fail over time?  Future research should report what we learn from these 
failures that can prevent future failures?  
Second, HRO’s reluctance to simplify interpretation was implemented by developing a 
robust context for the problem (e.g., root definition) to generate custom solutions.  There is a 
propensity to over-simplify situations and adopt popular best practices without success.  In this 
case, the Mindfulness and SSM methods encouraged communication and contemplation among 
caregivers to improve patient care through unique, targeted treatments. This reveals a sixth 
aspect of Mindfulness, namely that HROs have fast, accurate, and robust information systems. 
This is important because Mindfulness methods combined with “Learning by Doing” encourages 
reflection of these front-line providers. One of the physicians admitted that “…during heavy 
demand periods, standard treatments are sometimes applied without due consideration to the 
patient…due to the desire to relieve immediate suffering at all costs, even when alternative 
treatments may be more effective  long-term…”  Even after 50 years, there seems to be a paucity 
of published studies examining how Soft Methods can benefit organizations in United States 
(Checkland, 2011).    
 Third HRO’s sensitivity to operations was accomplished by creating and validating 
models of the system to adequately represent the real-world phenomenon.  Organizational 
sensitivity and what-if scenarios can only be useful with adequate models. Examples such as 
Figures 1 and 3 help participants visualize the relationships in key processes.     
Fourth, HRO’s under specification of structures encourages decision-making at the 
lowest levels of an organization. In CCU this was implemented with soft methods approach to 
identify and implement best solutions.  It is important to understand that, despite heavy 
promotion, there have been cases of improvement program failures (Beer, 2003).  One reason is 
that improvements are often driven from the top by external consultants, instead of front line 
workers who best understand the process (Ko, et al., 2005; Vrakking, 2006). Mindfulness 
encourages using front-line employees in decision-making, regardless of their rank. Practitioner 
research indicates that significant improvements do not take place until decision-making is 
pushed to the front-line (Robinson and Schroeder, 2009, p.33). More research is necessary to 
examine how to adopt SSM at the lowest-level, and how they interact with HROs and 
Mindfulness.   
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Fifth, HRO’s commitment to resilience was implemented by providing fully-functional 
life-support equipment.  It is important to develop resilience because disruptions severely limit 
an organization’s ability to perform (Bhamra, et al. 2011, p. 5375). According to Sutcliffe and 
Vogus (2003) not much attention has been given to the resilience of organizations.   The concept 
of resilience is known in science (Holling, 1973), engineering (Callister, 2003), organizational 
psychology (Powley, 2009), and supply chain management (Sheffi, 2007).  There is an 
opportunity to answer the How and Why questions of organizational resilience in different 
business context using soft methods.  
 
7. Conclusions 
 
HROs are organizations maintain processes with extremely low failure rates.  The 
purpose of this research was to show How to systematically implement HROs using SSM in a 
CCU.  It shows how Mindfulness techniques such as quiet mediation, mindful reflection, and 
communication are used to support and facilitate steps 1, 2, and 6 of SSM, and their counterparts 
in HRO aspects. In doing so, this research contributed to practitioners, showing How to 
systematically implement the five aspects of HRO using the steps of SSM, and how Mindfulness 
interacts with both to improve process reliability to create an HRO organization.  Why the 
aspects of HROs work is because they include the science-based framework of SSM, which can 
be supported though Mindfulness.  While they differ in semantics, the aspects of HROs are very 
similar to those in SSM, where Mindfulness literature reports improved healthcare reliability.  A 
graphical representation of the proposed relationships among SSM, Five Aspects, and 
Mindfulness is shown in Figure 4. However, this study found a sixth aspect related to 
communication, namely that HRO’s have “fast, accurate, and robust information systems”. In 
CCU, effective communication was key to supporting the other five aspects. 
_____________ 
Insert Figure 4 
_____________ 
 
An important step in SSM is to reflect on the implementation process. One of the key 
issues the participants discovered was the importance of information. At first they struggled with 
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is how to best report the information on daily and weekly progress, and in a timely and concise 
manner. Nurses and supervisors already read so many procedural and patient charts that the 
thought of reading more reports became distasteful. The expert panel identified a tool to report 
essential information in Lean and Six Sigma implementations could have been applied here 
called a “Toyota’s A3” report (Shook, 2009).  The A3 report is an effective tool because it 
contains minimal text, relying primarily on pictures, diagrams, and charts to communicate in a 
timely and concise manner.  According to Liker (2004) and Chakravorty and Hales (2013), world 
class companies such as Toyota routinely apply soft methods through A3’s to guide 
improvement efforts.  Future studies should examine how A3 reports can be used to implement 
the sixth aspect of HROs, namely “fast, accurate, and robust information sharing”. 
Finally, Wieck et al. (2008) identify organizations destroyed by a single incident of 
failure.  We find that harm can also occur in smaller doses. In fact, healthcare providers are no 
longer compensated for mistakes made by their own institutions. As these costs run into the 
millions of dollars per incident (McLaughlin and Kaluzny, 2004), the benefits of HRO have huge 
impacts. These failure costs can also apply to improvement programs such as Lean, Six Sigma, 
and Constraint Management. Some organizations attempt to restart these failed improvement 
programs and encounter a unique set of problems. The RHC refers to these restart attempts as 
Improvement Systems Recovery (ISR). 
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Figure 1 – Implementation Model 
 
 
 
22 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 – Data Collection Cycle 
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Figure 3 – Conceptual Model of Critical Care Unit 
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Figure 4 – The Graphical Representation 
 
 
 
TABLES 
 
Table 1 – Results of Q-Sort  
Respondent/ 
Category 
R 
1 
R 
2 
Nurse- 
Consultant 
Superv 
1 
Superv 
2 
RHC Fin 
 Chief 
Support  
Level 
SSM1  
5A1 
Mind1 
X X X X X X 6 
SSM2 
5A2 
Mind3 
X X X X X X 6 
5A3 
Mind3 
X X X X X X 6 
5A5 
SSM6 
Mind1&2 
X X X X X X 6 
5A5 
SSM7 
X X  X X  4 
5A3 
SSM4 
Mind3 
 X X  X  3 
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Table 2 – Performance Measures for Critical unit  
Measures  Prior to HRO 
January,2010 
– June 2010 - 
6 mo. 
During HRO 
January,2010 – 
December 2010 
12 mo. 
After HRO Impl 
June 2011- 
June 2012 
12 mo. 
Efficiency a) Total Cost for the CU Unit 
b) Total Cost per patient/day 
c) Number of patients/year admitted to CU 
d) Average number of hours in the CU/patient 
e) Average bed occupancy/utilization 
NR 
$5,350 
1,997 
73 hours 
87% 
NR 
$5,500 
3,998 
75 hours 
92% 
NR 
$5,400 
4,020 
70 hours 
94% 
Process a) # of negative interactions between nurse and 
patient’s family 
b) # of negative interactions between Dr. and 
patient’s family 
c) reliability of patient care measured as the 
percentage of patients discharged alive – and 
stable 
d) number of incidents of improper medication, 
dosage, or timeliness by CU 
e) number of improper/unnecessary 
notification to physicians 
f) number and duration of unit equipment 
failures – average time to repair/replacement 
g) number of failed shift-supervisor inspections 
for cleanliness, orderliness, and aesthetics 
h) number of CU unit policy violations such as 
visitation hours 
965 
 
NR 
 
1,875/1,997=93.8% 
 
 
0 
 
341 
 
32 – 3.5 hours 
 
53/550 = 9.6% 
 
5 
1,302 
 
NR 
 
3,974/3,998= 99.4% 
 
 
0 
 
510 
 
61 – 3.25 hours 
 
87/1100 = 7.9% 
 
8 
911 
 
144 
 
3,998/4,020=99.5% 
 
 
0 
 
120 
 
71 – 2.25 hours 
 
21/1100 = 2% 
 
8 
Outcome a) accidental patient lacerations by nurse or 
physician 
b) mortality rate of AMI (Acute Myocardial 
Infarction) measured as [# of AMI deaths/# of 
AMI live discharges] 
c) acute stroke mortality rate measured as [# of 
stroke deaths/# of stroke live discharges] 
d) central-line associated blood stream 
infections (CLABSI) 
e) death of surgical patients with STCs (Serious 
Treatable Complications) 
f) live discharge [# of deaths/# of admissions] 
0 
 
10/642 = 1.5% 
 
 
NR 
 
0 
 
7 
 
22/1,997 = 1.10% 
0 
 
14/1,310 = 1.1% 
 
 
NR 
 
0 
 
9 
 
24/3,998 = .60% 
0 
 
13/1,312=.9% 
 
 
NR 
 
0 
 
11 
 
22/4,020 = .55% 
 
 
